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Abstract: This paper examines the implications of bank activity and short-term funding strategies 
for bank risk and return using an international sample of 1334 banks in 101 countries leading up to 
the 2007 financial crisis.  Expansion into non-interest income generating activities such as trading 
increases the rate of return on assets, and it may offer some risk diversification benefits at very low 
levels.  Non-deposit, wholesale funding in contrast lowers the rate of return on assets, while it can 
offer some risk reduction at commonly observed low levels of non-deposit funding. A sizeable 
proportion of banks, however, attract most of their short-term funding in the form of non-deposits at 
a cost of enhanced bank fragility.  Overall, banking strategies that rely prominently on generating 
non-interest income or attracting non-deposit funding are very risky, consistent with the demise of 
the U.S. investment banking sector.  
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1.  Introduction 
  The recent financial crisis has important implications for feasibility of different banking 
models.  On the funding side, the crisis has clearly exposed the dangers of a bank’s excessive 
reliance on wholesale funding. Starting in August 2007, interbank money market rates in the U.S. 
rose dramatically reflecting perceptions of increased counter-party risk (see Taylor and Williams, 
2008; Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2008). By October 2008, interbank lending in the U.S. and 
in Europe had come to a virtual stand-still. To ward off a generalized bank liquidity crisis, 
authorities worldwide have taken unprecedented steps of providing extensive liquidity, giving 
assurances to bank depositors and creditors in the form of guarantees on interbank lending and in 
some cases blanket guarantees.   
  Similarly on the asset side, the crisis exposed weaknesses in different business models of banks. 
In trying to cope with the crisis, large U.S. investment banks have completely disappeared from the 
banking scene through bankruptcy (Lehman Brothers), takeovers (of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan 
Chase and of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America) and conversions into commercial banks (JP 
Morgan and Goldman Sachs).  Indeed, after the crisis, the U.S. has now come full circle, from the 
separation of commercial and investment banking through the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, to the re-
introduction of universal banking by way of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999, and, finally, to the 
disappearance of large independent investment banks all together in 2008.   
  All over the world, perceived costs and benefits of combining bank activities of various kinds 
have given rise to a wide variation in allowed bank activities.
 2  But after the crisis, the universal 
banking model, which allows banks to combine a wide range of financial activities, including 
                                                 
2 Universal banking model is common in Europe and in many other countries around the world. In the European Union, 
the Second Banking Directive of 1989 allows universal banking. A worldwide summary of restrictions on activities in 
securities markets, insurance, and real estate facing banks is contained in Barth et al. (2004).   3 
commercial banking, investment banking and insurance, has emerged as a more desirable structure 
for a financial institution from the viewpoint of policymakers due to its resilience to adverse shocks.   
  In this paper, we examine the implications of a bank’s activity mix and funding strategy for its 
risk and return. We represent a bank’s activity mix by the share of non-interest income in the form of 
fees, commissions and trading income in total operating income. On the liability side, we distinguish 
between deposits and other non-deposit short-term funding in the form of money market instruments 
such as CDs and interbank loans.  Our goal is to shed light on the risk-return trade-offs involved in 
the choice of different activity and funding strategies employed by banks.  
  Theory provides conflicting predictions about a bank’s optimal asset or activity mix, its 
optimal financing, and the optimal match between bank assets and liabilities. Banks gain information 
on their customers in the provision of one financial service that may prove useful in the provision of 
other financial services to these same customers. This suggests that banks optimally combine 
activities of various kinds, for instance loan making with securities underwriting (Diamond, 1991; 
Rajan, 1992; Saunders and Walter, 1994; and Stein, 2002).  Hence, combining different types of 
activities – non-interesting earning, as well as interest-earning assets – may increase return as well as 
diversify risks, therefore boosting performance.  The extent of risk diversification benefits of 
combining income-generating activities of various kinds further depend on the co-movements of the 
risky incomes from these activities. 
  However, the optimal size and scope of the banking firm in addition reflect finance-specific 
technologies and potential agency problems that arise within the banking firm if it becomes too 
complex (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1986).  Hence, even if further diversification into 
different activities may not be optimal in terms of the overall risk-return trade-offs the institution 
faces, insiders may still support this diversification as long as it enhances their ability to extract   4 
private benefits which are sufficiently large.  Another argument why differences in asset mix may 
impact an institution is that asset liquidity may enhance opportunities for bank managers to trade 
against the bank’s interest (Myers and Rajan, 1998). Therefore, diversifying into more liquid non-
traditional banking activities such as trading activities that generate non-interest income may end up 
increasing bank fragility and reduce overall performance.  
  On the funding side, information acquisition is equally important in determining the optimal 
mix of a bank’s deposit and non-deposit funding.  It is theoretically well-established that banks need 
to be partially equity-financed to provide bankers with appropriate incentives to monitor the projects 
they finance (Diamond,1984).
3  But a bank’s composition of debt and its ability to fund itself in 
wholesale capital markets provides signals of bank creditworthiness that are relevant to potential 
depositors at the bank as well.  For example, Calomiris (1999) discusses how holders of 
subordinated debt can perform the function of monitoring a bank if sub-debt is credibly excluded 
from deposit insurance.  Hence, non-deposit funding in a bank’s funding mix can actually reduce 
bank fragility through better monitoring.  
  But deposit and non-deposit funding tend to carry different risks in causing a potential liquidity 
crisis – through a bank run or a sudden halting of wholesale funding. For example, Huang and 
Ratnovski (2008) provide a model of the dark side of relying on wholesale funding in that wholesale 
financiers may have an incentive to withdraw funding on the basis of cheap and noisy signals of 
bank solvency, thereby causing solvent banks to fail.  Deposit and non-deposit funding are also 
different in terms of the speed and size of changes in funding costs.  The volume and price of 
wholesale funding, in particular, may adjust more quickly to reflect a bank’s riskiness – not least 
because customer deposits tend to be covered by deposit insurance. Rajan (1992) juxtaposes 
                                                 
3 Making a distinction between bank equity and demandable debt, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that demandable 
debt provides depositors with appropriate incentives to monitor banks and force liquidation of insolvent ones.   5 
informed and arm’s length debt to find that holders of informed debt –in this case wholesale 
financiers-  may duly foreclose on a firm with negative present value projects, but at a cost of  
suddenly demanding a rather high interest rate if the project is continued. 
  Other models consider the simultaneous determination of bank activities and bank funding, - 
the asset-liability matching problem - and provide a rationale for why traditional lending and deposit 
taking services are likely to be observed within the same firm.  One argument is that opaqueness of  
relationship lending enhances bank fragility since it makes it difficult for bank liability holders to 
assess bank solvency.  Therefore, to reduce bank fragility, banks making relationship loans are 
financed relatively heavily by core deposits, which are unlikely to be withdrawn prematurely since 
they are held for their liquidity services (Song and Thakor, 2007)
4. Another reason lending and 
deposit taking services can be provided within the same banking firm is because both financial 
services entail the provision of liquidity to bank customers, which in turn improves the institution’s 
own liquidity management (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2002).  These models would predict a high 
correlation between reliance on activities that generate interest income and deposit funding. 
  The purpose of this paper is three-fold.  First, we document trends in the relative importance of 
non-traditional banking activities and non-deposit funding in banks’ asset and funding mix for a 
large sample of international banks over the 1995-2007 period.  This is interesting as it illustrates the 
changes in asset and funding mix for different types of financial institutions prior to the latest crisis.  
Second, we present empirical evidence on the determinants of the fee income and non-deposit 
funding shares, by examining how these variables are related to a range of bank-level, 
macroeconomic and institutional indicators.  Finally, we assess how different activity mixes and 
                                                 
4 Retail or core deposits tend to differ from other forms of bank funding in that they are primarily held for their liquidity 
services and in that they are covered by deposit insurance. Flannery (1982) argues that retail deposits can be seen as a 
quasi-fixed factor of production of a bank on account of their sluggish adjustment, and that this explains the tendency of 
banks to insulate deposit interest rates from changes in market interest rates. Billett, Garfinkel and O’Neall (1998) 
further find that banks tend to raise their use of insured deposits following increases in risk, as proxied empirically by 
Moody’s downgrades.   6 
funding patterns are associated with bank risk and return. We measure a bank’s return by its return 
on assets. Our main measure of bank risk, in turn, is the distance to default or Z-score, defined as the 
number of standard deviations that a bank’s return on assets has to fall for the bank to become 
insolvent.   
  On average, financial institutions are shown to substantially combine interest generating and 
other income generating activities, with a mean fee income share of 0.35.  But this figure masks 
large differences across different types of institutions – while commercial banks, which make up the 
bulk of the sample, obtain around one third of their income from fee-generating activities, for 
investment banks this figure is over 75 percent.  Moreover, fee income share has been rising for all 
institutions over the sample period, with particularly steep increases in 2007 for investment banks, 
non-bank credit institutions and other financial institutions such as real estate mortgage banks and 
savings banks.    
  Most banks, instead, attract only a small share of their short-term funding in the form of non-
deposits, with a mean non-deposit funding share of 0.08. The distribution of the non-deposit funding 
share, however, has a fat tail of banks raising more than half of their short-term funding in the form 
of non-deposits.  And again, reliance on non-deposit funding has been increasing significantly for 
investment banks, non-bank credit institutions and other financial institutions such as real estate 
mortgage banks and savings banks, and markedly so in 2007.  Furthermore, we see that fee-income 
share and non-deposit funding share of institutions are indeed correlated, as suggested by asset-
liability matching models, but the correlation is around 35 percent.   
  Controlling for institutional differences, we see that greater reliance on fee-income generating 
activities and non-deposit funding are associated with larger, fast-growing institutions.  Reliance on 
non-deposit funding is also more common in developed countries, whereas developing country   7 
banks rely significantly more on fee-generating activities.  We find, among other things, that 
institutional factors that constrain banks’ asset mix and reduce its reliance on fee-generating 
activities- for example through regulations on activity restrictions- are also associated with increases 
in non-deposit funding, suggesting that banks may be circumventing such restrictions on their asset 
composition by adjusting their funding mix to increase their risk-taking. 
  We find that both a bank’s rate of return and its risk increase with its fee income share, 
suggesting trade-offs.  However, estimated coefficients also suggest that increasing the fee income 
share can yield some risk diversification benefits albeit at very low levels. In contrast, non-deposit, 
wholesale funding lowers the rate of return on assets, while it can also offer some risk reduction 
benefits again at low levels.   In robustness tests we also consider two alternative indices of bank 
return and risk: stock return volatility, another measure of risk, and a measure of risk-adjusted rate of 
return, the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio is given by the mean value of the return on equity divided 
by the standard deviation of the return on equity.   
  Finally, we address potential endogeneity problems by presenting IV estimates that use 
information about banking type (as a proxy for bank-specific activity restrictions) to construct 
instruments for bank activity and funding mix. Based on these estimates, a higher fee income or non-
deposit funding share continue to increase bank risk, and while we also find a positive impact of 
these variables on the rate of return, these findings are more subject to endogeneity concerns. At any 
rate, our IV estimates confirm that banking strategies that rely predominantly on generating non-
interest income or attracting non-deposit funding are very risky. 
  Our paper fills a gap in the literature since to our knowledge no empirical studies have 
considered the implications of a bank’s funding strategy for bank risk and return.  However, several 
studies have examined the implications of mixing various bank activities for bank risk using mostly   8 
U.S. data. Some of these studies consider how hypothetically combining banks with other types of 
financial or even non-financial firms would affect the variability of accounting measures of income 
or stock returns.
 5 Other studies look at the risk implications of actual combinations of traditional 
banking and other financial activities.
6 Among these, the closes to our study is Stiroh (2004) which 
considers how the share of non-interest income of U.S. banks has affected their risk and return. 
Specifically, Stiroh (2004) finds that Z-scores are highest for U.S. banks with a non-interest income 
share close to zero so that even a small exposure to non-traditional banking activities increases risk.  
Our paper goes beyond Stiroh’s (2004) analysis of the relationship between fee income on bank risk 
by considering an international data set, by providing estimation of the determinants of the fee 
income share, and by subjecting the relationship between bank risk and fee income to additional 
robustness tests. 
  Laeven and Levine (2008) use an international sample of 296 banks from 48 countries in 2001 
to examine how bank-level risk, measured alternatively by the Z-score and stock return variability, is 
affected by bank-level corporate governance and national bank regulations.  They show both factors 
affect bank risk.  In this paper our focus is not on regulations but we include country fixed effects in 
our estimation that are meant to capture this and other time-invariant country traits. Controlling for 
time-invariant measures of bank regulation, we find that banks that rely on fee generating activities 
to a greater extent are subject to greater risk.  
  Risk and return should be reflected in bank stock prices and thus stock market valuations can 
provide information about whether banks can create value by mixing different activities. DeLong 
(2001) considers stock price reactions to announcements of U.S. bank mergers over the 1988-1995 
                                                 
5 See Boyd and Graham (1988), Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993),  Lown et al. (2000 and ), and Saunders and Walter 
(1994) .   
6 See also DeYoung and Roland (2001), Geyfman (2005), Gayle (2001), Kwast (1989), Rosen et al. (1989), and 
Templeton and Severiens (1992).    9 
period and finds that only mergers of banks that are similar in activity and geographical location 
create value. Similarity in activity is defined on the basis of co-movements of stock returns of the 
two merging banks.  
  Laeven and Levine (2007) instead estimate a relationship between the q-value of a banking 
firm and an income diversity variable that measures closeness of the non-interest income share to 0.5. 
In fact, by this measure firms with equal net interest and non-interest incomes are completely 
diversified. Using data for 43 countries over the 1998-2002 period, the authors find that banks with 
highly diversified income streams tend to have low q-values – relative to banks that produce the 
same income combination in separate, specialized firms.  While the authors can not identify a single 
causal factor, they interpret their results as evidence of significant agency problems.  Our results can 
be seen as consistent and complementary since we find diversification benefits accrue at relatively 
low levels of fee-income share, potentially providing an alternative explanation of why greater 
diversification may lead to a discount.  In addition, the q-value measures the market value of a firm’s 
assets relative to their replacement cost and as such summarizes market valuation of the banking 
firm’s risky income stream. Our paper instead directly measures the impact of a bank’s fee income 
share on its risk and return.
7  
  Our paper is also related to Baele, De Jonghe  and Vander Vennet (2007), who examine how a 
bank’s share of non-interest income affects bank risk, as reflected in bank stock returns, for a sample 
of European banks over the period 1989-2004. Systematic risk, measured by the market beta, is 
found to increase with a bank’s non-interest income share. Idiosyncratic risk, in turn, is found to be 
                                                 
7 Our paper thus can be seen to provide information on how a bank’s risk and return are affected as some traditional bank 
intermediation (through loans and deposits) is replaced by other bank-assisted financial intermediation, rather than on the 
implications of re-organizing an existing pool of traditional and non-traditional bank activities in more specialized or less 
specialized institutions.   10 
related to the non-interest income share in a non-linear way, with most banks beyond the point 
where idiosyncratic risk is minimized.   
  In summary, we contribute to the literature in this area by (i) documenting the trends of both 
activity and funding shares for an international sample of 1334 banks in 101 countries leading up to 
the 2007 financial crisis; (ii) investigating bank and country level determinants of these shares; and 
(iii) analyzing the relationship between activity and funding mix on bank risk and return.  Our results 
have important policy implications for the debate on desirability of universal versus specialized 
banking models. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
documents the frequency distributions and time variation of the fee income and non-deposit funding 
shares. In addition, we take a first cursory look at the relationships between these two variables and 
bank risk and return through graphical analysis. Section 3 presents evidence on the determinants of 
the fee income and non-deposit funding shares. Section 4, in turn, presents evidence on the impact of 
the fee income and non-deposit funding shares on bank risk and return. Section 5 concludes by 
discussing the implication of our results for the viability of different models of the banking firm. 
Overall, we conclude that while universal banking can be beneficial in terms of diversifying risks 
and increasing returns, banking strategies that rely predominantly on generating non-interest income 
or attracting non-deposit funding are very risky. 
2.  The data 
2.1  The fee income share and the non-deposit funding share   
  Bank-level data in this study are taken from Bankscope. Our international sample of banks is 
restricted to banks with a stock exchange listing to ensure a relatively high quality of data and 
enhance comparability across countries. The sample period is from 1995 to 2007. In their annual   11 
statements, banks tend to report their net interest income and non-interest income in the form of fees, 
commissions and trading income. Using these data, we construct a bank’s fee income share as the 
share of non-interest income in total operating income.  We use this variable to proxy the overall 
relative importance of a bank’s non-interest generating activities.  Figure 1 plots the frequency 
distribution of the fee income share for the overall sample. To be precise, the figure reports the 
frequency of observations for this variable for each of the 20 intervals of size 0.05 between 0 and 1. 
Relatively few banks are seen to rely almost exclusively on fee income or net interest income. In fact, 
the distribution of the fee income share peaks for values of this variable between 0.25 and 0.30. The 
overall sample mean of the fee income share is 0.35. 
  Figure 2 shows that the average fee income share has increased over time. In fact, the average 
fee income share is seen to rise from 0.33 in 1999 to 0.38 in 2007. The time trend in the figure is 
limited to the years 1999-2007, as there are rather few observations in the years before 1999.  Our 
overall sample includes banks of different types that by their charters may differ in their allowed 
activities and in their regulation and supervision. Although 85 percent of the sample is comprised of 
commercial bank observations, the data source enables us to distinguish four main categories of 
banks: (i) commercial banks (including bank holding companies), (ii) investment banks and 
securities houses, (iii) non-bank credit institutions and (iv) other banks (this is a broad category of 
banks comprising cooperative banks, Islamic banks, medium and long term credit banks, and real 
estate and mortgage banks). Figure 3 provides time trends of the average fee income shares for 
banks in each of these four categories. Not surprisingly, the fee income share of investment banks 
and securities houses is higher throughout the sample period than for any other bank category. For 
each bank category, the fee income share has risen between 1999 and 2007. Steep increases in the   12 
fee income share in 2007 are seen for investment banks and securities houses, and for non-banking 
credit institutions, while the increase for commercial banks in this year is more modest. 
  On the liability side, a bank can fund itself through deposits or other short-term or long-term 
instruments. Other short-term instruments include interbank borrowings, certificates of deposit and 
short-term bonds. Investors may hold these latter categories of non-deposit funding either directly or 
indirectly through money market funds. Deposits tend to be instantly demandable, while non-
deposits are considered term financing, even if the term may be very short as in the case of overnight 
inter-bank lending. In addition, customer deposits tend to be covered by deposit insurance up to 
some coverage limit, while non-deposits are generally excluded from explicit deposit insurance. For 
this reason, to the extent they are unsure they will be bailed out in the event of failure, providers of 
non-deposit funding have an incentive to monitor the bank and may withdraw their financing more 
readily than depositors if doubts about bank stability arise. We construct the share of non-deposit 
funding in total short-term funding as an index of a bank’s funding strategy.  
  Figure 4 represents the distribution of the non-deposit funding share for the overall sample. 
Most banks are seen to have non-deposit funding shares of close to zero. In fact, 61.3 percent of 
banks have non-deposit funding shares of less than 0.05. Interestingly, however, there are a 
significant number of banks with rather high non-deposit funding shares. In fact, 6.0 percent of 
banks have a non-deposit funding share above 0.5. In Figure 5, we see that the overall trend in the 
non-deposit funding share has been downward over the 1999-2007 period.
8 This is surprising given 
the frequent allusion to non-deposit funding as a cause of bank instability in the recent financial 
crisis. The overall sample data, however, hide considerable variation in the time paths of the non-
deposit funding shares for our four categories of banks, as seen in Figure 6. In fact, the non-deposit 
funding share has risen in three of our categories (investment banks and securities houses, non-bank 
                                                 
8 Short-term, non-deposit funding also declined as a share of total liabilities or assets.   13 
credit institutions, and other banks) during the sample period, and markedly so in 2007. The non-
deposit funding share has instead been on a downward trend for commercial banks. Thus, the 
downward trend of the non-deposit funding share in Figure 4 reflects the experience of commercial 
banks, which make up 85 percent of banking observations in our overall sample. 
 
2.2  Bank risk and return variables 
  In this paper, a bank’s return is proxied by the return on assets, computed as pre-tax profits 
divided by assets. Later in the paper we investigate how the return on assets is affected by a bank’s 
income mix and funding pattern. Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of these relationships. 
Specifically, the figure plots the average return on assets for each of the 20 groups of bank 
observations, each containing 5 percent of total observations in increasing order. The highest return 
on assets is achieved by banks that rely primarily on fee income. Generally, the relationship between 
the bank rate of return on assets and the fee income share is seen to be U-shaped. Thus, banks that 
specialize in generating either interest income or fee income achieve a higher return on assets than 
banks that substantially mix the two income categories. Figure 7 in analogous fashion also plots the 
relationship between the bank rate of return and the non-deposit funding share. The figure reflects 
that about 30 percent of bank observations, corresponding to 6 groups, have a non-deposit funding 
share of zero. Interestingly, bank rate of return is seen to be highest for the banks that do not attract 
any non-deposit funding at all. The overall relationship between the bank rate of return and the non-
deposit funding shares is again U-shaped so that substantial mixing of both deposit and non-deposit 
funding is associated with a relatively lower return on assets.  
  As a measure of bank risk, we use the Z-score which is the number of standard deviations that 
a bank’s rate of return of assets has to fall for the bank to become insolvent. The Z-score is   14 
constructed as the sum of the mean rate of return on assets and the mean equity-to-assets ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (Ray, 1952). A higher Z-score signals a 
lower probability of bank insolvency. We calculate a Z-score for a bank, if it can be based on annual 
accounting data for at least 4 years. Figure 8 displays relationships between the Z-score on the one 
hand and the income and funding shares on the other. The Z-score is shown to be lowest for banks 
that obtain almost exclusively fee income. Overall, the relationship between the Z-score and the fee 
income share appears to be an inverted U. This suggests that mixing interest-generating and fee-
generating activities provides some risk diversification benefits. Specifically, bank risk appears to be 
lowest for banks with fee income shares between the 20
th and 25
th percentile of this variable’s 
distribution.
9   Figure 8 also displays the relationship between the Z-score and the non-deposit 
funding share. Attracting some non-deposit funding is seen to increase the Z-score and thus it 
appears to reduce bank risk. The Z-score peaks for the group of banks between the 80
th and 85
th 
percentile of the distribution of the non-deposit funding share, after which is goes back down. Thus, 
the Z-score peaks for banks high up in the distribution of the non-deposit funding share variable, 
although even these banks have rather low non-deposit funding shares of less than 0.1 as evident 
from Figure 4.  
   Table 1 reports the correlation coefficients between a bank’s fee income and non-deposit 
funding shares, and its risk and return outcomes. We note that the fee income and non-deposit 
funding shares have a positive and significant correlation coefficient of 0.30. Thus, banks that are 
non-traditional in having a high fee income share tend to be also non-traditional in having a 
relatively high non-deposit funding share. Rajan and Stein (2002) and Song and Thakor (2007) 
provide models of the co-existence of lending and deposit-taking within the same financial 
                                                 
9 This finding contrasts with the Stiroh (2004) who shows in his Figure 8 that the Z-score declines with the non-interest 
income share over its entire range.   15 
institution which are consistent this finding. Next, the correlation between the rate of return on assets 
and the fee income share is 0.13 and statistically significant, while the correlation between the rate of 
return on assets and the non-deposit funding share is also positive but not statistically significant. 
Finally, the Z-score in turn has as negative and significant correlation with the fee income share of -
0.27 and also a negative and significant correlation with the non-deposit funding share of -0.04.   
 
2.3  Control variables  
  In the subsequent empirical analysis, we make use of a number of control variables. These 
controls are several bank characteristics and characteristics of the macroeconomic and institutional 
environment that can be expected to affect a bank’s income and funding mixes as well as risk and 
return outcomes. Specifically, we use four bank-level controls. First, assets is the log of assets to 
proxy for bank size. Second, equity is the ratio of equity to assets to measure bank capitalization. 
Third, we construct asset growth as the growth rate of real bank assets to allow for the possibility 
that fast-growing banks have different income and funding strategies as well as risk and return 
outcomes. Fourth, the overhead variable is constructed as the ratio of overhead expenses to assets to 
represent a bank’s cost structure. Next, there are three macroeconomic control variables. These are 
the rate of inflation, the growth rate of GDP, and GDP per capita.  Specifically, we control for 
annual inflation rate since inflation can affect bank performance and may influence bank decisions to 
diversify into fee-income generating activities.   We control for the annual growth rate in the real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person to control for business cycle fluctuations and overall 
economic conditions.  We include GDP per capita as an index of the overall level of economic 
development.    16 
  Finally, several regulatory and other institutional variables are included in some empirical 
specifications. The variable restrict is a composite index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities 
from Barth et al. (2004). It measures the degree to which banks face regulatory restrictions on their 
activities in securities markets, insurance, real estate, and owning shares in non-financial firms. The 
restrict variable ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating greater restrictions. Next, capital is 
an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, summarizing information about balance sheet items 
that can serve as bank capital as well as the magnitude of bank capital requirements. Official, in turn, 
is an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency to undertake actions such as 
demand information, force a bank to change its organizational structure or oblige it to suspend 
dividend payments. Another regulatory variable is diversification, which represents the strictness of 
loan diversification guidelines imposed on banks.  
  Banks can also be affected by aspects of the legal system that apply to companies more broadly. 
Thus, rights is an index of the legal protection of shareholder rights from La Porta et al. (1998). It 
ranges from 0 to 6, with greater values indicating greater protection of shareholders rights. In 
addition, self-dealing is an indicator of anti-self-dealing regulations from Djankov et al. (2005). It 
measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against self-dealing by controlling 
shareholders. Finally, financial freedom is an index of financial market freedoms from the Heritage 
Foundation. It is scaled from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater financial freedoms. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in this study.  
  As indicated, the GDP per capita variable can be seen as an overall index of a country’s level 
of development. As such, we will use it as an independent variable to illustrate the variation in bank 
interest income shares, non-deposit funding shares, and bank risk and return. To get a feel for the 
impact of economic development, Table 3 provides averages of the main bank-level variables   17 
separately for developing and developed countries. Banks in developed countries are shown to rely 
relatively less on fee income and to attract relatively more non-deposit funding. Further, banks in 
richer countries achieve relatively low returns on assets, while their average Z-scores tend to be 
higher. 
  
3.  The determinants of the interest income share and the funding pattern 
  A bank’s realized income stream reflects a bank’ strategy, its capacities as well as the market 
environment in which it operates. The non-deposit funding share similarly reflects funding intentions 
as well as funding possibilities. This section presents the results of regressions that aim to explain 
variation in income and funding shares through a range of bank and bank-environment variables that 
can be expected to be relevant for a bank’s activity and funding mix. To start, Table 4 presents the 
results of regressions that use individual bank-year observations. The regressions include country 
and year fixed effects, and clustering of the errors at the bank level. Regression 1 relates the fee 
income share to only bank-level variables. We see that investment banks tend to rely on fee income 
more than others.  Similarly, larger, faster-growing financial firms tend to have higher fee income 
shares. On the whole, controlling for everything else fee-generating activities appear to be associated 
with greater equity.  Further, banks with large overheads are estimated to have higher fee income 
shares, suggesting that fee-generating activities are relatively costly. Regression 2 in addition 
includes some macroeconomic controls. High inflation, and high GDP growth are seen to be 
associated with a higher fee income share. These results can reflect that the macroeconomic 
environment affects the share of bank resources allocated to fee-generating and interest-generating 
activities as well as their relative profitability.    18 
  Regressions 3 and 4 in the table have the non-deposit funding share as the dependent variable, 
and are otherwise fully analogous to regressions 1 and 2. Interestingly, the same bank variables that 
tend to give rise to a higher fee income share also give rise to a higher non-deposit funding share, 
with few differences.  Association with asset growth is much stronger, whereas equity is no longer 
significant.  This suggests that fast-growing banks appear to be relatively heavily financed through 
non-deposits, increasing leverage.  In addition to investment banks, non-bank credit institutions also 
rely more heavily on non-deposit financing.  Regression 4 includes the macroeconomic controls, and 
shows that the non-deposit funding share has a weaker association with macroeconomic variables, 
with a lower non-deposit share in high inflation and high growth countries. 
  Next, Table 5 reports the results of regressions of the fee income and non-deposit funding 
shares that – in addition to the bank-level and macroeconomic variables of Table 4 – include one of 
several regulatory and other institutional variables at a time. Regressions of the fee income share and 
the non-deposit funding share are reported in Panels A and B, respectively. The institutional 
variables do not vary over time. Thus, we can only estimate the cross-sectional effect of these 
variables. To reflect this, we use mean values of all bank and macroeconomic variables in the 
regressions rather than yearly observations as in Table 4. Estimation is by OLS with clustering of the 
errors at the country level. In the table, we only report the estimated coefficients for the institutional 
variables for brevity.  
  The regressions in Panel A show that the fee income share is related to several institutional 
variables in a statistically significant way. To start, in regression 1 we see that the fee income share 
is negatively related to restrictions on bank activities. This is to be expected as restrictions tend to 
prevent fee-generating activities. In regression 2, the fee share is also negatively related to the 
protection of shareholder rights. This could reflect a conflict of interest between bank managers and   19 
shareholders, if bank managers stand to benefit relatively more from expansion into non-interest 
income generating activities. Such activities tend to be supported by liquid assets, which provide 
bank managers with relatively straightforward opportunities for theft and self-dealing according to 
Myers and Rajan (1998). In regression 3, the fee income share is further negatively related to 
restrictions against self-dealing. Since self-dealing is likely to be a relatively important problem with 
fee-generating activities, restrictions on self-dealing can be expected to allow banks to expand their 
interest-generating activities.  Finally, in regression 5, the fee income share is negatively associated 
with the index of official bank regulatory power. This could reflect that powerful bank regulators are 
relatively successful in curtailing a bank’s perceived risky expansion into fee-generating activities.  
  An analogous set of regressions of the non-deposit funding share is reported in Panel B. 
Interestingly, institutional indices that are associated with a higher fee income share appear to give 
rise to a lower non-deposit funding share. Specifically, the non-deposit funding share is negatively 
and significantly related to the restrict, rights and official variables in regressions 1, 2 and 4 of Panel 
B, respectively. Thus, an interesting question is what can explain the apparent opposite impact of the 
institutional environment on the fee income and non-deposit funding shares. Remember from Table 
1 that bank risk, proxied by the Z-score, is positively correlated with both the fee income share and 
the non-deposit funding share. This suggests that institutional factors that reduce the fee income 
share also reduce bank risk, thereby creating room for banks to take on additional risk by increasing 
their non-deposit funding share.  The results of Tables 4 and 5 together provide suggestive evidence 
that the positive correlation between a bank’s fee income share and its non-deposit funding share 
reported in Table 1 appears to result from variation in bank characteristics and not from cross-
country variation in the institutional environment. 
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4.  Evaluation of bank risk and return 
4.1  Basic results 
  In this section, we examine the relationships between the fee income and non-deposit funding 
shares on the one hand and bank risk and return on the other. To start, Table 6 reports results of 
regressions that have the rate of return on assets as the dependent variable. The regressions include 
country and year fixed effects and have clustering of the errors at the bank level. Regression 1 
includes the fee income share, in addition to a range of bank-level and macroeconomic controls. The 
fee income share obtains a positive coefficient of 0.017 that is statistically significant. Thus, firms 
with a focus on generating fee income tend to have a higher rate of return on assets. We further see 
that banks that are well-capitalized and grow fast tend to have a high return on assets. Banks in an 
inflationary environment and in countries with high GDP growth similarly tend to achieve a high 
rate of return on assets. Next, regression 2 relates the rate of return on assets to the non-deposit 
funding shares and controls as before. The non-deposit funding share is estimated to have a negative 
but insignificant impact on the bank rate of return. Among the controls, the assets variable now 
enters with a positive and significant coefficient to suggest that larger banks achieve higher rates of 
return. Regression 3 includes both the fee income and non-deposit funding shares in the regression. 
Consistent with the previous two regressions, the fee income share obtains a positive and significant 
coefficient, while the estimated coefficient for the non-deposit funding share is insignificant. From 
Figure 7, we see that the relationships between the bank rate of return on the one hand and the fee 
income and non-deposit funding shares on the other could well be non-linear. To allow for non-
linearities in the estimation, regression 4 includes linear as well as quadratic terms in both the fee 
income and non-deposit funding shares. Now the linear fee income share variable obtains a negative 
coefficient of -0.021 that is significant at 10 percent, and a positive quadratic coefficient of 0.040   21 
that is significant at 1 percent. These results provide evidence that the relationship between the rate 
of return and the fee income share is indeed non-linear. The estimated coefficients suggest that the 
rate of return is lowest for banks with a fee income share of 0.26. 
  We next consider how a bank’s Z-score, as an index of bank risk, is related to the fee income 
and non-deposit funding shares. Table 7 presents regressions of the Z-score that are analogous to the 
rate of return regressions in Table 6. The table has two panels that use mean data for the entire 
sample period and data for the single year 2004, respectively. Specifically, in Panel A we relate an 
overall Z score (computed using data over the entire sample period) to mean values of right-hand-
side variables. In Panel B, instead we compute a Z-score for 2004 (using 2004 data for the rate of 
return on assets and on the equity-to-assets ratio but multi-year data to construct the standard 
deviation of the rate of return on assets) to right-hand-side variables also for 2004. In both panels, 
errors are clustered at the country level.  Starting with regression 1 in Panel A, we see that the Z-
score is negatively and significantly related to the fee income share. This suggests that a higher fee 
income share reduces bank stability. Banks with high overheads are further estimated to be less 
stable, while banks operating in countries with high levels of GDP appear to be more stable. In 
regression 2 of Panel A, the non-deposit funding share is seen to enter the regression with a negative 
but statistically insignificant coefficient.  Next, regression 3 of Panel A includes both the fee income 
and non-deposit funding shares, to yield a coefficient for the fee-income share that, as before, is 
estimated to be negative and statistically significant.  
  Finally, regression 4 of Panel A includes linear and quadratic terms in both the fee income and 
non-deposit funding shares. Both linear terms obtain positive coefficients, while both quadratic 
terms obtain negative coefficients. All four variables, apart from the linear fee income share, enter 
the regression significantly. Point estimates suggest that the Z-score peaks for fee income and non-  22 
deposit funding shares of 0.04 and 0.47, respectively.
10 Qualitatively, these results are consistent 
with the inverted U-shaped relationships between the Z-score on the one hand and the fee income 
and non-deposit funding shares on the other in Figure 8. Thus, there may only be a limited potential 
to reduce bank risk by venturing into fee-generating activities, while bank risk is potentially reduced 
by combining deposit and non-deposit funding.  
  The Z-score regressions with 2004 data reported in Panel B of Table 7 are very similar to those 
reported in Panel B. Specifically, in regressions 1 and 3 the fee income share continues to obtain 
negative and significant coefficients. In regression 4, the linear and quadratic terms in the fee income 
share similarly continue to obtain negative and positive coefficients, respectively, but now both 
coefficients fail to be statistically significant. This regression does not provide support for the 
hypothesis that the relationship between the Z-score and the fee income share is non-linear. 
  Our fee income variable reflects non-interest income in the form of fees, commissions and 
trading income. To conclude this section, it is interesting to break this variable down into a trading 
income part and a non-trading, non-interest income part (with both variables defined as shares of 
total operating income). Specifically, columns 1 to 3 of Table 8 report regressions of the bank rate of 
return that include a trading income variable, a non-trading, non-interest income variable and these 
two variables together, respectively. The trading income variable enters columns 1 and 3 with 
positive and significant coefficients, while the non-trading income variable obtains insignificant 
coefficients in columns 2 and 3. Trading income rather than non-trading, non-interest income 
appears to increase a bank’s rate of return. Analogously, columns 4 to 6 of Table 8 relate the Z score 
to trading income, non-trading, non-interest income and both, respectively. Now we see that both 
types of non-interest income (of the trading and non-trading type) reduce the Z-score significantly. 
                                                 
10 Note that these results suggest that for all but a few percent of banks a higher fee income share increases risk at the 
margin (unlike in Figure 8), while they confirm that for the great majority of banks a higher non-deposit funding share 
reduces risk (as in Figure 8).    23 
Thus trading income appears to present banks with a trade-off between risk and return, while non-
trading, non-interest income increases risk without a concomitant increase in return.
11  
 
4.2  Alternative measurement of bank risk     
  As robustness checks, we next consider how two alternative measures of bank risk and return 
are affected by the bank income mix and funding pattern. The first of these is the Sharpe ratio, 
defined as the mean return on equity (calculated as pre-tax profits relative to equity) divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on equity. The Sharpe ratio thus is a risk-adjusted rate of return and 
it is calculated only if bank data for at least 4 years are available. Second, to represent bank risk we 
also look at the variability of a bank’s stock return. Specifically, we compute the standard deviation 
of the dividend-inclusive bank stock return on a yearly basis using weekly data. 
  Table 9 reports the results of regressions of the Sharpe ratio. This variable is related to mean 
values of right-hand-side variables, while errors are clustered at the country level. In regression 1, 
the fee income share is seen to obtain a coefficient that is negative and statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with the negative relationship between the fee income share and the rate of return 
on assets in the analogous regression 1 of Table. The Sharpe ratio is further estimated to be lower for 
banks with high overhead costs, but higher in countries with higher GDP per capita levels. In 
regression 2, the non-deposit funding share is estimated to obtain a positive but insignificant 
coefficient. Next, in regression 3 with the fee income and non-deposit funding share again enter with 
positive and negative coefficients, respectively, but now both coefficients are statistically significant. 
Finally, in regression 4 coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms for the fee income and non-
funding shares suggests that the relationships between the Sharpe ratio and the two shares have 
                                                 
11 In his Table 5, Stiroh (2004) instead includes a trading income share defined as trading income relative to total non-
interest income. This variable fails to have a significant impact on the bank mean rate of return on equity and the Z-score. 
Fiduciary income, however, is estimated to increase the Z-score, while fee income is estimated to reduce the Z-score.   24 
inverted U-shapes, with the proviso that only the linear non-deposit funding variable and the 
quadratic fee income variable are estimated with significant coefficients. These regressions can be 
interpreted as combining the results of separate return and risk regressions of the previous tables.  
Hence, adjusted for risk, higher levels of fee income reduce returns, while the impact of non-deposit 
funding is not as significant.  
  Table 10 reports regressions of the variability of the bank stock returns. These regressions 
include country and year fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the bank level. In regression 1, the 
fee income share obtains a positive and significant coefficient. Thus, fee income appears to increase 
bank risk, consistent with the finding that fee income reduces the Z-score in the analogous regression 
1 of Table 7. Bank size is seen to be negatively related to bank stock volatility, while banks with 
high overheads and in richer countries instead appear to have more volatile returns. In regression 2, 
we see that a higher non-deposit funding share also is positively and significantly related to bank 
stock return variability. In line with this, the fee income and non-deposit funding share variables 
both positive and significant coefficients in regression 3. In contrast, none of the linear or quadratic 
fee income and non-deposit funding shares are estimated with significant coefficients in regression 4. 
Overall, the result that fee income increases bank risk appears to be robust to a change in the risk 
measure. The non-deposit funding, is now found to increase bank stock volatility, even though there 
appears to be no significant effect on the Z-score in Table 7. 
 
4.3  Endogeneity issues 
  Influences on a bank’s risk and return may cause it to adjust its fee income share and its non-
deposit funding share. In this section, we present approaches to deal with possible endogeneity of 
this kind. The first approach is to replace the fee income and non-deposit funding shares with lagged   25 
values. We apply this approach to the estimation of the bank rate of return in Table 6 and to the 
estimation of the Z-score in Table 7. The results of rate of return regressions with lagged fee income 
and non-deposit funding shares are presented in Table 11. We see that the results in Tables 6 and 11 
are very similar. In regression 1 of Table 11, the fee income share is again estimated to have a 
positive and significant impact on the bank rate of return, while in regression 2 the non-deposit 
funding share fails to be estimated with a significant coefficient. Table 12 displays the results of Z-
score regressions with lagged fee income and non-deposit funding shares. In regression 1 of Table 
12, the fee income share again has a negative and significant impact on the Z-score. In regression 2, 
however, the non-deposit funding share now has a negative and significant impact on the Z-score, 
while in the corresponding regression in Table 7 the estimated coefficient was insignificant. 
Regression 4 of Table 12, which includes quadratic fee income and non-deposit funding shares, 
again suggests that the relationship between the Z-score and the two shares have an inverted U-
shaped, although only the quadratic fee income share is estimated with a significant coefficient. 
  Previously, we distinguished among 4 bank categories in Figures 3 and 6. Banks of different 
types are shown to differ materially in both their fee income share and their non-deposit funding 
share as shown in Table 4.  This suggests that information about a bank’s type can be used to 
instrument for the fee income and non-deposit funding shares.  Banking type may affect a bank’s fee 
income and non-deposit funding shares in several ways. Most obviously, a bank’s type entails a 
specific charter that outlines allowed and disallowed bank activities. Investments banks, for instance, 
may be restricted form attracting retail deposits, which naturally increases their non-deposit funding 
share. Similarly, non-banking credit institutions may not be allowed to engage in investment banking 
activities, which limits their potential to generate fee income. Banking type may further affect the fee 
income and non-deposit funding shares through differences in bank regulation and supervision.   26 
Investment banks, for instance, generally are exempt from minimum capital requirements. This 
suggests that banking type may indirectly affect bank return and risk through a bank’s capitalization 
ratio as represented by the equity variable in our empirical specifications. Banks of different type 
may, of course, also differ in their access to the financial safety net in the form of, for instance, 
central bank loans. The rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the subsequent availability of 
central bank credit support to all U.S. investments, however, suggest that differences in financial 
safety net coverage across banks of different types may in practice not be very large. 
  With four bank categories, we can create three independent banking type dummy variables for 
each bank. Specifically we have dummy variables capturing whether a bank is an investment bank or 
security house, whether it is non-bank credit institution, and whether it falls into the other category. 
These three banking type dummies are used to instrument for the fee income share and the non-
deposit funding shares in regressions of the bank rate of return on assets corresponding to 
regressions 1 and 2 in Table 6.
12 The resulting IV regressions are presented as column 1 in Panels A 
and B of Table 13, respectively. Both fee income share and non-deposit funding share have a 
positive and significant impact on the bank rate of return.   Note that in the first-stage regressions 
banking type dummies are highly correlated with the asset and funding mix, as expected. 
  Our IV estimation assumes that banking type is exogenously given. Conceivably, banking type 
could react to banking strategy and performance and hence be endogenous. This is not very likely as 
none of our banks has changed banking type during the sample period.
13 All the same, in column 2 
of Table 13, we present IV results where we take banking type dummies for 2001 to instrument for 
                                                 
12 We do not instrument for quadratic fee income and non-deposit funding variables to reflect that the instruments are 
dummy variables. 
13 The conversion of Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan from investment banks into commercial banks in September 2008, 
however, shows that a change in banking type can happen.   27 
the fee income and non-deposit funding shares in the subsequent 2002-2007 period. The results are 
seen to be very similar to those in column 1. 
  For our instruments to be valid instruments, not only do they need to be correlated with 
variables in question but they should not enter the second stage regressions, thus satisfying the 
exclusion restrictions.  Conceptually, it is plausible that the only effect banking type has on bank risk 
and return is through the impact it has on activity and funding mix.  We report two tests of 
specification in the tables.  The Hausman test has the null hypothesis that the IV and OLS estimators 
are not statistically different.  The overid test is a joint test that the instruments are valid and the 
exclusion restriction holds.  While the Hausman test cannot be rejected for any of the specifications 
(casting doubt on the need for IV in the first place),  the overid test is rejected for all specifications 
except, column 2 of Panel A (casting doubt on the validity of the instruments).   
  Next, Table 14 presents IV regressions of the Z-score. Specifically, in Panel A we report 2 
regressions relating the Z-score to the instrumented fee income share based on regression 1 of Table 
7, Panel A, while in Panel B we report 2 regressions of the Z-score on the non-deposit funding share 
based on regression 2 of Table 7, Panel A. In Table 13, we see that the Z-score is negatively and 
significantly related to the fee income share in the 2 second-stage regressions. The estimated 
coefficient for the instrumented fee income share is -39.485 in column 1, which suggests that an 
increase of the fee income share from 0 to 0.5 reduces the Z-score of the mean bank from 30.740 to 
10.998 to reflect significantly higher bank risk. In Panel B, the Z-score is in turn negatively and 
significantly related to the non-deposit funding share in the second-stage regressions. The 
instrumented non-deposit funding share obtains an estimated coefficient of -41.004 so that an 
increase of the non-deposit funding share from 0 to 0.5 is calculated to reduce the Z-score of the 
mean bank from 30.740 to 10.238.   The specification tests for fee income share confirm the validity   28 
of the instruments in both specifications.  This is also true for the first specification with the non-
deposit funding variable.  
  Overall, the results in this section confirm that higher fee income and non-deposit funding 
share increase bank risk.  The impact on returns is subject to greater endogeneity concerns however, 
and suggest that the fee income and non-deposit funding shares are not fully exogenous to the rate of 
return. 
  
5.  Conclusion 
  The recent financial crisis has seen the demise of large investment banks in the U.S. This major 
change in the financial landscape has brought back to the fore the issue of the optimal banking 
model. In our view, the debate about banking models is ultimately an empirical one. In the recent 
crisis, banks that got into trouble most deeply generated substantial non-interest income through the 
trading of mortgage-backed securities or they relied heavily on the wholesale capital markets for 
their funding. These observations lead us to construct bank-level indices of the share of non-interest 
income in total income and of non-deposit funding in total short-term funding as proxies of a bank’s 
asset and funding strategy or business model. We see substantial cross-bank variation in effective 
business models in our sample of international banks for the 1995-2007 period. This paper 
investigates in some detail the bank-level, macroeconomic and institutional determinants of banking 
strategies, as proxied by the non-interest income and the non-deposit funding shares. We find, in 
particular, that large and fast-growing banks tend to have higher non-interest income and non-
deposit funding shares. 
  The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on what bank income and funding 
strategies perform well in terms of producing profitable and stable banks. In particular, we examine   29 
how a bank’s income and funding mixes affect the rate of return on its assets and Z-score or distance 
to default. Our basic regressions suggest that at low levels of non-interest income and non-deposit 
funding, there may be some risk diversification benefits of increasing these shares, although at 
higher levels of non-interest income and non-deposit funding shares further increases result in higher 
bank risk. 
  A bank’s income and funding strategies and its return and risk outcomes may be determined 
simultaneously. Therefore, we instrument for bank income and funding mixes using information 
about banking type as a proxy for bank-specific banking powers and allowed activities. Our IV 
results qualify our basic findings and can be summarized as follows: a higher non-interest income or 
non-deposit funding share engenders a materially higher bank risk, but the impact of either variable 
on the rate of return on assets is difficult to establish due to endogeneity concerns.  
  The collapse of the U.S. investment banking sector shows that the market can weed out banks 
that have chosen an apparently unviable business model. All the same, there is an important role for 
policy as well, as bank collapses, such as in the U.S. investment banking case, can have important 
real side effects and impose high costs on the taxpayers through the financial safety net. The 
observed variation in policies regarding banking powers and restrictions over time and across 
countries, also suggests that policy makers are experimenting with different banking models, 
searching for an optimal model for banks. The evidence presented in paper suggests that traditional 
banks – with a heavy reliance on interest-income generating and deposit funding – are safer than 
banks that go very far in the direction of non-interest income generation and funding through the 
wholesale capital market.  Our results provide a strong indication that banking strategies that rely 
preponderantly on non-interest income or non-deposit funding are indeed very risky.     30 
  However, our results do not suggest that banks with systemic importance should completely 
eschew non-interest income generating and non-deposit funding, suggesting that universal banking 
can be beneficial.  Nevertheless, evidence of diversification benefits is weak. Hence, while universal 
banking model may be the best way to conduct investment banking business in a safe and sound 
manner, our results also suggest that there may limits to how far banks can steer away from the 
traditional model of interest income generation and deposit taking.  
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Table 1 
Correlations of Fee Income and Non-deposit  
Funding Shares with Bank Risk and Return 
 
This table presents correlations among variables. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total 
operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & 
short-term funding. Return on assets is the profit before tax as a percentage of total assets of a bank. Z-score 
is a measure of bank solvency defined as
SROA
CAR ROA+
, where ROA is the return on assets, CAR represents 
the capital assets ratio and SROA stands for the standard deviation of return on assets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 




assets  Z-score 
         
Fee income  1       
Non-deposit funding  0.3042***  1     
Return on assets  0.1271***  0.0022  1   
Z-score  -0.2713***  -0.0396***  0.0193  1 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics on Bank, Macroeconomic and Institutional Variables 
 
The table presents summary statistics of variables. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total 
operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & 
short-term funding. Fee income sq and non-deposit funding sq are the squares of fee income and non-deposit 
funding, respectively. Return on assets is the profit before tax as a percentage of total assets of a bank. Z-
score is a measure of bank solvency defined as
SROA
CAR ROA+
, where ROA is the return on assets, CAR 
represents the capital assets ratio and SROA stands for the standard deviation of return on assets. Assets is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in US $.  Equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined as equity as a 
percentage of total assets. We used one period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets growth is the inflation-
adjusted  growth  rate  of  bank  assets.  Overhead  is  defined  as  overheads  as  a  percentage  of  total  assets. 
Investment bank dummy, Non-bank credit institution dummy and other dummy are dummy variables that equal 
1 for investment bank, non-bank credit institution and other banks, respectively, and 0 otherwise. All bank 
level variables are from Bankscope. Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer prices. GDP growth is 
the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 
constant US$. The macroeconomic data are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) of World 
Bank. Restrict is the index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities from Barth et al. (2003). It takes value 
from  3  to  11  with  higher  values indicating  more restrictiveness. Rights  measures the  legal  protection of 
shareholders from La Porta et al. (1998), ranging from 0 to 5 with higher values indicating more protection of 
shareholders. Self-dealing is the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2005), ranging from 0 to 1 with a 
higher value indicating more control of self-dealing. Capital is the  index of regulatory oversight of bank 
capital from Barth et al. (2003). It ranges from 3 to 10 and higher values indicate greater stringency. Official 
is an index of power of commercial bank supervisory agency, from Barth et al. (2003). It measures the power 
of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems, with higher values 
indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks from 
Barth et  al.  (2003).  It  ranges  from  0  to  2,  with  higher  values  indicating  more  diversification.  Financial 
freedom is from the Economic Freedom Indicators of Heritage Foundation. It is scaled from 0 to 100 where 
100 with higher values indicating greater freedom.  
Variable 
No. of 
observations  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Bank variables           
Fee income  7266  0.353  0.218  0  1 
Fee income sq  7266  0.172  0.22  0  1 
Non-deposit funding  7212  0.081  0.151  0  1 
Non-deposit funding sq  7212  0.03  0.108  0  1 
Return on assets  7416  0.018  0.038  -0.805  0.416 
Z-score  6554  30.740  26.863  0.068  147.055 
Assets  7416  21.907  2.113  15.009  28.306 
Equity  5988  0.119  0.127  0  1 
Assets growth  5646  0.094  0.188  -3.103  0.996 
Overhead  7403  0.043  0.083  0  3.415 
Investment bank dummy  7416  0.073  0.260  0  1 
Non-bank credit institution dummy  7416  0.030  0.172  0  1 
Other dummy  7416  0.045  0.207  0  1 
Macroeconomic variables           
Inflation  7069  0.045  0.169  -0.013  4.317 
GDP growth  6932  -0.008  0.036  -0.290  0.120 
GDP per capita  7136  24.788  14.647  0.129  54.178   36 
Regulatory and institutional variables         
Restrict  7225  7.604  1.338  3  11 
Rights  6353  4.120  1.208  0  5 
Self-dealing  6818  0.561  0.173  0.080  1 
Capital  7048  6.112  1.189  3  10 
Official  7177  12.002  1.844  4  14 
Diversification  7228  1.748  0.455  0  2 
Financial freedom  7364  67.045  21.648  10  90 
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Table 3 
Main Bank Variables for Developing and Developed Countries 
 
This table presents the mean and number of observations of main variables by country type and t-statistics for 
mean comparison. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit 
funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Return on assets 




, where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands for 
standard deviation of return on assets. The data for these bank level variables are from Bankscope.  
 
Country     Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding share  Return on assets  Z-score 
Developing 
countries  Mean  0.385  0.064  0.024  17.692 
  N  1887  1862  1911  1687 
Developed countries   Mean  0.342  0.088  0.016  35.263 
  N  5379  5350  5505  4867 
Total  Mean  0.353  0.081  0.018  30.740 
  N  7266  7212  7416  6554 
Mean comparison 
test  t-statistics  7.336  -5.954  8.030  -24.159 
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Table 4 
The Fee Income and Non-deposit Funding Shares 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is Fee income, and the dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is 
Non-deposit funding. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit 
funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Assets is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in US $. Equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined as equity as a 
percentage of total assets. We used one period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets growth is the inflation-
adjusted  growth  rate  of  bank  assets.  Overhead  is  defined  as  overheads  as  a  percentage  of  total  assets. 
Investment bank dummy, Non-bank credit institution dummy and other dummy are dummy variables that equal 
1 for investment bank, non-bank credit institution and other banks, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The data for 
these bank level variables are obtained from Bankscope. Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer 
prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP per capita is 
in  thousands  of  2000  constant  US$.  All  these  macroeconomic  variables  are  from  World  Development 
Indicators  (WDI)  of  World  Bank.  We  estimate  all  regressions  using  country  and  time  fixed  effects  and 
clustering at bank level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Fee income  Fee income  Non-deposit funding  Non-deposit funding 
Assets  0.034***  0.034***  0.029***  0.029*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Equity  0.183***  0.169***  0.009  0.014 
  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.072)  (0.073) 
Assets growth  0.036*  0.048**  0.046***  0.050*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Overhead  1.424***  1.461***  0.346**  0.349** 
  (0.213)  (0.218)  (0.147)  (0.150) 
Investment bank dummy  0.291***  0.289***  0.184***  0.184*** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.038)  (0.038) 
Non-bank credit institution dummy  -0.022  -0.021  0.273***  0.273*** 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
Other dummy  -0.039  -0.031  0.032  0.032 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
Inflation    0.783***    -0.191* 
    (0.212)    (0.111) 
GDP growth    0.318*    -0.158* 
    (0.168)    (0.087) 
GDP per capita    -0.003    0.005 
    (0.004)    (0.004) 
N  5511  5412  5472  5371 
R-sq  0.566  0.573  0.398  0.397 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank   39 
Table 5 
The Fee Income and Non-deposit Funding Shares and Institutional Development 
 
Panel A reports the relationship between Fee income and institutional variables. Panel B represents the relationship between Non-deposit funding 
and institutional variables. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-
deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Restrict is the index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities from Barth et al. 
(2003). It takes value from 3 to 11 with higher values indicating more restrictiveness. Rights measures the legal protection of shareholders from La 
Porta et al. (1998), ranging from 0 to 5 with higher values indicating more protection of shareholders. Self-dealing is the anti-self-dealing index 
from Djankov et al. (2005), ranging from 0 to 1 with higher value indicating more control of self-dealing. capital is the  index of regulatory 
oversight of bank capital from Barth et al. (2003). It ranges from 3 to 10 and higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of 
power of commercial bank supervisory agency, from Barth et al. (2003). It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines 
imposed on banks from Barth et al. (2003). It ranges from 0 to 2, with higher values indicating more diversification. Financial freedom is from the 
Economic Freedom Indicators of Heritage Foundation. It is scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Bank-level and 
macroeconomic variables included in regression 2 of Table 4 are included as well but they are not reported. We estimate all regressions with mean 
data and clustering at country level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
   Panel A: Fee income                
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Restrict  -0.025***             
  (0.006)             
Rights    -0.020*           
    (0.010)           
Self-dealing      -0.118*         
      (0.060)         
Capital        -0.001       
        (0.008)       
Official          -0.014***     
          (0.004)     
Diversification            -0.005   
            (0.018)   
Financial freedom              0.000 
              (0.000) 
N  1165  1025  1126  1134  1154  1166  1190 
R-sq  0.490  0.497  0.469  0.475  0.499  0.467  0.465   40 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Clustering level  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country 
  Panel B: Non-deposit funding         
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Restrict  0.009**             
  (0.004)             
Rights    0.022***           
    (0.007)           
Self-dealing      0.027         
      (0.041)         
Capital        0.001       
        (0.008)       
Official          0.008**     
          (0.004)     
Diversification            0.024   
            (0.018)   
Financial freedom              0.000 
              (0.000) 
N  1153  1016  1115  1122  1142  1154  1179 
R-sq  0.241  0.264  0.239  0.246  0.247  0.238  0.231 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Clustering level  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country   41 
Table 6 
Determinants of the Return on Assets 
 
The dependant variable is Return on assets, which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets of a bank. Assets is the natural 
logarithm of total assets in US $. Equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined as equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one period 
lag  of equity  in  the  regressions. Assets growth  is the inflation-adjusted growth rate  of  bank assets. Overhead is  defined as  overheads  as  a 
percentage of total assets. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-
deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Fee income sq and non-deposit funding sq are the square of fee income and non-
deposit funding, respectively. We get the data for these bank level variables from Bankscope. Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer 
prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 constant US$. 
We obtain these macroeconomic variables from World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. We estimate all regressions using country 
and time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assets  0.000  0.002**  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Equity  0.082***  0.110***  0.078***  0.073*** 
  (0.017)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Assets growth  0.011***  0.011***  0.008**  0.007* 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Overhead  -0.127  -0.020  -0.141  -0.152 
  (0.084)  (0.065)  (0.095)  (0.096) 
Fee income  0.017**    0.015**  -0.021* 
  (0.008)    (0.007)  (0.011) 
Non-deposit funding    -0.004  0.003  0.004 
    (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.012) 
Fee income sq        0.040*** 
        (0.015) 
Non-deposit funding sq        -0.007 
        (0.018) 
Inflation  0.151***  0.126***  0.133***  0.128*** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
GDP growth  0.122***  0.091***  0.102***  0.101*** 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.032)   42 
GDP per capita  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
N  5412  5371  5303  5303 
R-sq  0.270  0.289  0.284  0.290 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Table 7 
Determinants of the Z-Score 
 
The dependant variable is Z score defined as 
SROA
CAR ROA+
 where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands 
for standard deviation of return on assets. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in US $. Equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined 
as equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets growth is the inflation-adjusted growth rate of 
bank assets. Overhead is defined as overheads as a percentage of total assets. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total operating 
income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Fee income sq and non-deposit 
funding sq are the square of fee income and non-deposit funding, respectively. We get the data for these bank level variables from Bankscope. 
Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP 
per capita is in thousands of 2000 constant US$. We obtain these macroeconomic variables from World Development Indicators (WDI) of World 
Bank. We estimate all regressions with clustering at country level. For panel A, both the dependent and independent variables are mean value over 
years.  For  Panel B, the dependent and independent  variables are  for  year  2004. Standard  errors are in  parentheses.   *, **  and ***  denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A      
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assets  -1.369  -2.113**  -1.534  -2.020* 
  (0.876)  (0.878)  (1.018)  (1.067) 
Equity  16.769  9.402  20.678**  24.161*** 
  (10.098)  (13.618)  (9.824)  (8.307) 
Assets growth  16.292*  13.940  15.545  15.702* 
  (9.762)  (9.727)  (9.901)  (9.259) 
Overhead  -62.909***  -95.542***  -80.516***  -68.815*** 
  (12.278)  (31.970)  (17.958)  (16.957) 
Fee income  -27.171***    -29.537***  2.735 
  (4.193)    (4.709)  (17.816) 
Non-deposit funding    -2.846  11.091  53.564*** 
    (5.839)  (6.866)  (16.897) 
Fee income sq        -34.575** 
        (15.869) 
Non-deposit funding sq        -56.499*** 
        (20.237) 
Inflation  -16.008  -10.527  -5.169  2.926 
  (28.718)  (31.389)  (29.521)  (28.427)   44 
GDP growth  -40.889  -42.347  -25.912  3.760 
  (57.711)  (65.110)  (58.158)  (56.739) 
GDP per capita  0.535***  0.603***  0.529***  0.537*** 
  (0.141)  (0.169)  (0.146)  (0.137) 
N  919  918  905  905 
R-sq  0.188  0.154  0.192  0.203 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Clustering level  Country   Country   Country   Country  
 Panel B   
Assets  -2.328**  -3.085***  -2.426**  -2.807** 
  (0.942)  (0.813)  (1.062)  (1.135) 
Equity  27.109*  24.503  47.188**  46.403*** 
  (14.478)  (20.762)  (18.911)  (14.776) 
Assets growth  -2.662  -1.953  -3.910  -3.095 
  (7.217)  (7.578)  (6.675)  (7.286) 
Overhead  -77.679***  -87.087*  -112.604***  -96.979*** 
  (14.675)  (48.429)  (24.499)  (25.768) 
Fee income  -26.626***    -28.694***  -9.943 
  (6.563)    (5.679)  (27.444) 
Non-deposit funding    -2.428  10.593  53.377*** 
    (5.682)  (7.315)  (18.235) 
Fee income sq        -20.880 
        (25.883) 
Non-deposit funding sq        -63.898*** 
        (22.447) 
Inflation  -0.949  -4.279  8.760  6.661 
  (65.905)  (70.101)  (66.347)  (66.448) 
GDP growth  -52.199  -52.079  -49.458  -37.441 
  (68.086)  (73.732)  (70.107)  (67.929) 
GDP per capita  0.594***  0.648***  0.592***  0.599*** 
  (0.168)  (0.190)  (0.180)  (0.161) 
N  835  828  818  818 
R-sq  0.147  0.124  0.152  0.158 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Clustering level  Country   Country   Country   Country    45 
 
Table 8 
Splitting fee income into trading income and other income  
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is Return on assets defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets of a bank. The dependent 
variable in columns 4 to 6 is Z score defined as 
SROA
CAR ROA+
 where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA 
stands for standard deviation of return on assets. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in US $. Equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is 
defined as equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets growth is the inflation-adjusted growth 
rate of bank assets. Overhead is defined as overheads as a percentage of total assets. Trading income is the share of trading income in total 
operating income. Non-trading, non-interest income is defined as the share of non-trading, non-interest income in total operating income. Inflation 
is the inflation rate based on consumer prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP per capita 
is in thousands of 2000 constant US$. We obtain bank level data from Bankscope and macroeconomic variables from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. We estimate all regressions with clustering at bank level. Standard errors are included in parentheses.  *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   Return on Assets  Return on Assets  Return on Assets  Z score  Z score  Z score 
Assets  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.246  0.169  0.606 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.617)  (0.590)  (0.586) 
Equity  0.054***  0.060***  0.052***  29.083**  28.913***  33.643*** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (11.353)  (10.199)  (10.323) 
Assets growth  0.011**  0.012**  0.010**  -0.257  -0.491  0.288 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (3.769)  (3.731)  (3.759) 
Overhead  -0.071  -0.081  -0.095 
-
105.775***  -75.211***  -61.957*** 
  (0.075)  (0.085)  (0.089)  (14.593)  (14.178)  (13.824) 
Trading income   0.033**    0.038**  -24.656***    -32.982*** 
  (0.015)    (0.017)  (6.922)    (6.233) 
Non-trading, non-interest income     0.008  0.014    -21.314***  -25.390*** 
    (0.009)  (0.010)    (6.455)  (6.249) 
Inflation  0.152***  0.162***  0.141***  34.704**  37.282**  55.043*** 
  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (16.957)  (14.802)  (17.590) 
GDP growth  0.128***  0.132***  0.125***  17.526  16.737  23.194 
  (0.039)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (15.523)  (13.666)  (15.122) 
GDP per capita  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.637  0.234  0.513   46 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.565)  (0.559)  (0.559) 
N  3838  3838  3838  3527  3527  3527 
R-sq  0.221  0.210  0.227  0.271  0.276  0.285 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level   Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Table 9 
Determinants of the Sharpe Ratio 
 
The dependant variable is Sharpe ratio constructed as
SROE
ROE
 where ROE is return on equity and 
SROE represents standard deviation of return on equity. Assets is the natural logarithm of total 
assets in US $. equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined as equity as a percentage of 
total assets. We used one period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets growth is the inflation-
adjusted growth rate of bank assets. Overhead is defined as overheads as a percentage of total 
assets. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit 
funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Fee 
income sq and non-deposit funding sq are the squares of fee income and non-deposit funding, 
respectively. Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer prices. GDP growth is the inflation 
adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 
constant US$. Both the dependent and independent variables are mean values over years. We 
obtain bank level data from Bankscope and macroeconomic data from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. We estimate all regressions with mean data and clustering at 
country level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assets  -0.076  -0.219  -0.153  -0.218 
  (0.122)  (0.164)  (0.145)  (0.166) 
Equity  0.578  -0.943  0.344  1.150 
  (1.245)  (1.265)  (1.162)  (0.977) 
Assets growth  1.825  1.234  1.480  1.511 
  (2.451)  (2.253)  (2.493)  (2.378) 
Overhead  -5.221**  -8.047**  -7.624***  -5.703* 
  (2.439)  (3.840)  (2.537)  (3.205) 
Fee income  -3.267***    -4.140***  1.652 
  (0.861)    (1.138)  (2.483) 
Non-deposit funding    1.256  3.629**  8.886* 
    (0.916)  (1.522)  (5.052) 
Fee income sq        -6.338*** 
        (2.128) 
Non-deposit funding sq        -6.652 
        (5.736) 
Inflation  -3.507  -1.668  -0.696  0.412 
  (4.100)  (4.235)  (3.938)  (3.995) 
GDP growth  -22.007**  -19.071**  -16.882**  -12.466* 
  (9.544)  (9.334)  (8.063)  (7.404) 
GDP per capita  0.056**  0.062**  0.052**  0.054** 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
N  918  918  905  905 
R-sq  0.099  0.072  0.110  0.120 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Clustering level  Country   Country   Country   Country  
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Table 10 
Determinants of the Stock Return Variability 
 
The  dependant  variable  is  the  Stock  return  variability  representing  the  annualized  standard 
deviation of weekly stock returns. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in US $. Equity is 
the capital to asset ratio, which is defined as equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one 
period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets growth is the inflation-adjusted growth rate of bank 
assets. Overhead is defined as overheads as a percentage of total assets. Fee income is the share 
of non-interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit 
short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Fee income sq and non-deposit funding 
sq are the squares of fee income and non-deposit funding, respectively. Inflation is the inflation 
rate based on consumer prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per 
capita of the country. GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 constant US$. We obtain bank 
level data from Bankscope and macroeconomic data from World Development Indicators (WDI) 
of World Bank. We estimate all regressions using country and time fixed effects and clustering at 
bank level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assets  -0.010***  -0.008***  -0.010***  -0.010*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Equity  -0.123*  -0.089  -0.139**  -0.142** 
  (0.072)  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
Assets growth  0.023  0.013  0.020  0.018 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Overhead  0.433***  0.476***  0.511***  0.493*** 
  (0.128)  (0.146)  (0.172)  (0.175) 
Fee income  0.157***    0.111***  0.073 
  (0.035)    (0.030)  (0.067) 
Non-deposit funding    0.124***  0.071**  0.060 
    (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.064) 
Fee income sq        0.044 
        (0.070) 
Non-deposit funding sq        0.009 
        (0.074) 
Inflation  0.234  0.290  0.126  0.119 
  (0.346)  (0.331)  (0.334)  (0.336) 
GDP growth  0.313  0.357  0.247  0.246 
  (0.313)  (0.284)  (0.289)  (0.289) 
GDP per capita  0.015**  0.014**  0.014**  0.014** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
N  4343  4312  4256  4256 
R-sq  0.313  0.315  0.331  0.331 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Table 11 
The Return on Assets with Lagged Fee Income and Non-deposit Funding Shares 
 
The dependant variable is Return on assets defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total 
assets of a bank.  Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in US $. equity is the capital to 
asset ratio, which is defined as equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one period lag of 
equity  in  the  regressions.  Assets  growth  is  the  inflation-adjusted  growth  rate  of  bank  assets. 
Overhead is defined as overheads as a percentage of total assets. Fee income is the share of non-
interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit short-
term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Fee income sq and non-deposit funding sq 
are the square of fee income and non-deposit funding, respectively. We take one year lag of fee 
income, non-deposit funding and their squares in our regressions. Inflation is the inflation rate 
based on consumer prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of 
the country. GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 constant US$. We obtain the bank level 
variables  from Bankscope and  macroeconomic  variables  from World Development  Indicators 
(WDI) of World Bank. We estimate all regressions using country and time fixed effects and 
clustering at bank level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assets  0.000  0.001*  0.000  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Equity  0.080***  0.112***  0.084***  0.079*** 
  (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
Assets growth  0.010***  0.011***  0.009**  0.008** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Overhead  -0.157*  -0.023  -0.113  -0.122 
  (0.088)  (0.061)  (0.092)  (0.092) 
Fee income (one-year lag)  0.015**    0.007  -0.025** 
  (0.008)    (0.006)  (0.011) 
Non-deposit funding (one-year lag)    0.001  0.009  0.008 
    (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Fee income sq (one-year lag)        0.037** 
        (0.015) 
Non-deposit funding sq (one-year lag)        -0.004 
        (0.015) 
Inflation  0.155***  0.128***  0.146***  0.142*** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
GDP growth  0.121***  0.098***  0.114***  0.113*** 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
GDP per capita  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
N  5410  5372  5304  5304 
R-sq  0.274  0.296  0.284  0.288 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Clustering level  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
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Table 12 
The Z-score with Lagged Fee Income and Non-deposit Funding Shares 
 
The dependant variable is Z score defined as 
SROA
CAR ROA+
 where ROA is return on assets, CAR 
represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands for standard deviation of return on assets. Assets 
is the natural logarithm of total assets in US $. equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined 
as equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one period lag of equity in the regressions. 
Assets  growth  is  the  inflation-adjusted  growth  rate  of  bank  assets.  Overhead  is  defined  as 
overheads as a percentage of total assets. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total 
operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total 
deposits & short-term funding. Fee income sq and non-deposit funding sq are the square of fee 
income and non-deposit funding, respectively. Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer 
prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP 
per capita is in thousands of 2000 constant US$. We take mean value of all the variables for 
period 2002-2007, except fee income, non-deposit funding and their squares, which take mean 
value for period 1995-2001. We obtain bank level data from Bankscope and macroeconomic data 
from World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. We estimate all regressions with 
clustering at country level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assets  -1.343**  -2.134***  -1.410*  -1.925** 
  (0.564)  (0.611)  (0.753)  (0.746) 
Equity  23.322**  3.851  23.162**  27.375*** 
  (9.621)  (12.757)  (10.190)  (9.653) 
Assets growth  23.120**  15.683  22.294**  24.729*** 
  (9.235)  (10.163)  (9.003)  (8.927) 
Overhead  -57.868***  -65.862*  -68.477***  -61.727*** 
  (10.156)  (33.888)  (18.715)  (21.078) 
Fee income  -31.464***    -33.336***  19.507 
  (3.360)    (4.302)  (14.262) 
Non-deposit funding    -11.158**  7.236  36.337 
    (5.573)  (8.220)  (21.856) 
Fee income sq        -56.347*** 
        (14.472) 
Non-deposit funding sq        -32.323 
        (26.227) 
Inflation  -63.906  -55.436  -59.687  -58.445 
  (56.038)  (56.494)  (55.748)  (53.300) 
GDP growth  -130.403  -141.872  -124.794  -105.808 
  (82.474)  (85.392)  (80.344)  (76.240) 
GDP per capita  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
N  704  709  693  693 
R-sq  0.185  0.137  0.185  0.197 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N  N  N 
Clustering level  Country   Country   Country   Country  
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Table 13 
Determinants of the Return on Assets: IV Estimation  
 
The dependent variable is Return on assets. Return on assets is defined as profit before tax as a 
percentage of total assets of a bank. Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total 
operating income. Non-deposit funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total 
deposits & short-term funding. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in US $. Equity is the 
capital to asset ratio, which is defined as equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one 
period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets growth is the inflation-adjusted growth rate of bank 
assets. Overhead is defined as overheads as a percentage of total assets. the data for these bank 
level variables are obtained from Bankscope. Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer 
prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP 
per capita is in thousands of 2000 constant US$. All these macroeconomic variables are from 
World  Development  Indicators  (WDI)  of  World  Bank.  The  regressions  in  Panel  A  use 
instruments for the Fee income variable, and the regressions Panel B use instruments for the Non-
deposit  funding  variable.  The  regressions  in  column  1  use  as  instruments  dummy  variables 
indicating whether the bank is an investment bank, a non-bank credit institution, or a bank in the 
other category. The regressions in column 2 use as instruments dummy variables indicating in 
2001 whether the bank is an investment bank, a non-bank credit institution, or a bank in the other 
category. Other data are for 2002-2007. We estimate all regressions using country and time fixed 
effects.  We also report the coefficient estimates for the instrumental variables of the first-stage 
regression, the p-value of the F-test of joint significance of identifying instruments, the p-value of 
the Hausman specification error test which compares the difference between the IV and OLS 
estimators, and the p-value of the Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions. Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A  (1)  (2) 
  IV: Bank category  IV: Bank category 2001 
Fee income share  0.035***  0.039*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Assets  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Equity  0.076***  0.079*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Assets growth  0.010***  0.010*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Overhead  -0.159***  -0.200*** 
  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Inflation  0.134***  0.123** 
  (0.037)  (0.055) 
GDP growth  0.114***  0.091** 
  (0.030)  (0.046) 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
First-stage     
Instrumental variables     
Investment bank dummy   0.289***  0.284*** 
  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Non-bank credit institution dummy   -0.021  -0.012 
  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Other dummy   -0.031***  -0.020 
  (0.012)  (0.013)   52 
N  5412  4279 
R-sq  0.260  0.295 
F-test of instruments (p-value)  0.000  0.000 
Hausman test (p-value)  1.000  1.000 
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value)  0.023  0.103 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y 
     
Panel B  (1)  (2) 
Non-deposit funding  0.018***  0.015** 
  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Assets  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Equity  0.107***  0.109*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Assets growth  0.010***  0.010*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Overhead  -0.031***  -0.047*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Inflation  0.128***  0.117** 
  (0.034)  (0.051) 
GDP growth  0.093***  0.066 
  (0.029)  (0.043) 
GDP per capita  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
First-stage     
Instrumental variables     
Investment bank dummy   0.184***  0.179*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Non-bank credit institution dummy   0.273***  0.277*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Other dummy   0.032***  0.031*** 
  (0.010)  (0.011) 
N  5371  4241 
R-sq  0.278  0.294 
F-test of instruments (p-value)  0.000  0.000 
Hausman test (p-value)  1.000  1.000 
Hansen J -test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value)  0.000  0.000 
Country fixed effects  Y  Y 
Time fixed effects  Y  Y   53 
Table 14 
Determinants of the Z-score: IV Estimation 
The dependent variable is the Z score defined as 
SROA
CAR ROA+
 where ROA is return on assets, 
CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands for standard deviation of return on assets 
Fee income is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. Non-deposit funding is 
the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. Assets is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in US $. Equity is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined as 
equity as a percentage of total assets. We used one period lag of equity in the regressions. Assets 
growth is the inflation-adjusted growth rate of bank assets. Overhead is defined as overheads as a 
percentage of total assets. The data for these bank level variables are obtained from Bankscope. 
Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer prices. GDP growth is the inflation adjusted 
growth rate of GDP per capita of the country. GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 constant 
US$.  All  these  macroeconomic  variables  are  from  World  Development  Indicators  (WDI)  of 
World Bank. The regressions in Panel A use instruments for the Fee income variable, and the 
regressions Panel B use instruments for the Non-deposit funding variable. The regressions in 
column 1 use as instruments dummy variables indicating whether the bank is an investment bank, 
a non-bank credit institution, or a bank in the other category. The regressions in column 2 use as 
instruments dummy variables indicating in 2001 whether the bank is an investment bank, a non-
bank credit institution, or a bank in the other category. Other data are for 2002-2007. We estimate 
all regressions with mean data and clustering at country level. We also report the coefficient 
estimates for the instrumental variables of the first-stage regression, the p-value of the F-test of 
joint significance of identifying instruments, the p-value of the Hausman specification error test 
which  compares  the  difference  between  the  IV  and  OLS  estimators,  and  the  p-value  of  the 
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
   (1)  (2) 
  IV: Bank category  IV: Bank category 2001 
Fee income share  -39.485***  -26.815*** 
  (13.872)  (5.030) 
Assets  -0.940  -1.258*** 
  (0.661)  (0.487) 
Equity  23.079**  19.417** 
  (11.093)  (9.233) 
Assets growth  17.607**  16.190** 
  (7.161)  (6.691) 
Overhead  -43.388  -62.585*** 
  (29.177)  (20.772) 
Inflation  -18.800  -22.612 
  (32.263)  (45.325) 
GDP growth  -40.745  -53.638 
  (45.269)  (50.358) 
GDP per capita  0.510***  0.529*** 
  (0.072)  (0.073) 
First-stage     
Instrumental variables     
Investment bank dummy   0.251***  0.274*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Non-bank credit institution dummy   -0.042  -0.034 
  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Other dummy   0.035  0.042   54 
  (0.028)  (0.028) 
N  919  904 
R-sq  0.183  0.182 
F-test of instruments (p-value)  0.000  0.000 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.999  0.977 
Hansen J -test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value)  0.615  0.796 
Country fixed effects  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N 
     
Panel B  (1)  (2) 
Non-deposit funding  -41.004**  -39.635** 
  (16.639)  (16.986) 
Assets  -1.056  -1.031 
  (0.659)  (0.667) 
Equity  13.294  10.004 
  (9.707)  (9.961) 
Assets growth  16.741**  15.660** 
  (7.397)  (7.080) 
Overhead  -63.889**  -51.935** 
  (25.261)  (20.717) 
Inflation  -39.978  -50.142 
  (35.678)  (48.896) 
GDP growth  -92.731*  -101.761* 
  (51.868)  (57.128) 
GDP per capita  0.636***  0.608*** 
  (0.070)  (0.077) 
First-stage  0.012  0.016 
Instrumental variables  0.137  0.02 
Investment bank dummy   0.164***  0.148*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Non-bank credit institution dummy   0.226***  0.248*** 
  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Other dummy   0.002  -0.004 
  (0.025)  (0.025) 
N  918  902 
R-sq  0.115  0.109 
F-test of instruments (p-value)  0.000  0.000 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.645  0.703 
Hansen J -test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value)  0.135  0.020 
Country fixed effects  N  N 
Time fixed effects  N  N 
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 Appendix A. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable  Description  Sources 
     
Fee income   Share of non-interest income in total operating income  Bankscope 
Fee income sq  Square of fee income share  Bankscope 
Non-deposit funding   Share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term 
funding. 
Bankscope 
Non-deposit funding sq  Square of non-deposit funding  Bankscope 
Trading income   Share of trading income in total operating income  Bankscope 
Non-trading, non-interest income   Share of non-interest, non-trading income in total operating income  Bankscope 
Return on assets  Pre-tax profits divided by assets  Bankscope 
Z-score 
Index of bank solvency constructed as
SROA
CAR ROA+
 where ROA is 
return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SROA stands 
for standard deviation of return on assets. 
Bankscope 
Sharpe ratio 
Risk-adjusted rate of return constructed as
SROE
ROE
 where ROE is return 
on equity and SROE represents standard deviation of return on equity. 
Bankscope 
Stock return variability  Annualized standard deviation of  weekly dividend-inclusive bank stock 
returns 
Bankscope 
Assets  Log of assets in millions of  US dollars  Bankscope 
Equity  Lag of ratio of equity to assets  Bankscope 
Assets growth  Real growth rate of bank assets computed using CPI  Bankscope and World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
Overhead  Overhead expenses divided by assets  Bankscope 
Inflation  Consumer price inflation rate  WDI 
GDP growth  Rate of real per capita GDP growth  WDI 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita in thousands of 2000 constant U.S. dollars  WDI 
Restrict  Index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities  Barth et al. (2004) 
Rights 
Index of legal protection of shareholders, ranging from 0 to 5 with 
higher values indicating more protection of shareholders  La Porta et al. (1998)   56 
Self-dealing 
Index of anti-self-dealing regulation, ranging from 0 to 1 with higher 
value indicating more control of self-dealing.  Djankov et al. (2008) 
Capital 
Index of regulatory oversight of bank, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher 
values indicate greater stringency 
Barth et al.  (2004) 
Official 
Index of power of commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures the 
power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent 
and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. 
Barth et al.  (2004) 
Diversification 
Index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 
2 with higher values indicating more diversification. 
Barth et al.  (2004) 
Financial freedom 
Index of financial freedom, scaled from  0 to 100 with higher values 
indicating greater freedom. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of the fee income share.  
The fee income share is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. The plot shows the frequency 
distribution of the fee income share in our dataset. The horizontal axis represents intervals of the fee-based income 
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Figure 2. Trend of the fee income share.   
The fee income share is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. This figure displays the trend of 
























Figure 3. Trend of the fee income share by categories of bank type.  
The fee income share is the share of non-interest income in total operating income. This plot shows the trend of the 
fee income share by bank categories from 1999 to 2007. Bank categories are commercial banks, investment bank 
or securities house, non-banking credit institution and other. Subcategories of commercial banks are bank holdings 
and holding companies, and commercial banks. Subcategories of other are cooperative banks, Islamic banks, 
medium and long term credit banks, real estate mortgage banks and savings banks. The data are from Bankscope.  
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Figure 4. Distribution of the non-deposit funding share.   
The non-deposit funding share is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. 
The plot shows the frequency distribution of the non-deposit funding share in our dataset. The horizontal axis 
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Figure 5. Trend of the non-deposit funding share.  
The non-deposit funding share is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits & short-term funding. 
This figure displays the trend of the non-deposit funding share from 1999 to 2007. The non-deposit funding share 























Figure 6. Trend of non-deposit funding share by categories of bank type.  
This plot shows the trend of non-deposit funding share by bank categories from 1999 to 2007. Bank categories are 
commercial banks, investment banks or securities houses, non-banking credit institutions and other. Subcategories 
of commercial banks include bank holdings and holding companies, and commercial banks. Subcategories of other 
are cooperative banks, Islamic banks, medium and long term credit banks, real estate mortgage banks and savings 
banks. The data are from Bankscope.  
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Figure 7. Return on assets by fee income and non-deposit funding share.  
Return on assets is pre-tax profits divided by assets. The fee income share is the share of non-interest income in 
total operating income. The non-deposit funding share is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total 
deposits & short-term funding. The plots display the rate of return on assets by fee income share and non-deposit 
funding share. The horizontal axis represents the 20 bins of the fee income share (the non-deposit funding share), 
with each bin containing 5 percent of observations of one of these two variables in increasing order. The vertical 
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Figure 8. Z-score by fee income and non-deposit funding shares.  
The Z score is defined as 
SROA
CAR ROA+
 where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio 
and SROA stands for standard deviation of return on assets. The fee income share is the share of non-interest 
income in total operating income. The non-deposit funding share is the share of non-deposit short-term 
funding in total deposits & short-term funding. This figure shows the Z-score by fee income and non-deposit 
funding shares.  The horizontal axis represents the 20 bins of the fee income share (the non-deposit funding 
share), with each bin containing 5 percent of observations of one of these two variables in increasing order. 
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